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ABSTRACT
When identity-based authorization becomes difficult due to the
scalability requirements and highly dynamic nature of open dis-
tributed systems, digitally certifiable attributes can be an effective
basis for specifying authorization policies. Before an authoriza-
tion decision is made in such a system, a client needs to collect
a set of credentials to prove that it satisfies the authorization poli-
cies. The process to construct such a proof is often interactive and
multilateral, involving multiple parties iteratively requesting cre-
dentials from one another before presenting all their own relevant
credentials; we call this a distributed proof of authorization (DPA).
DPAs can be carried out in multiple ways. A resource provider
can passively wait for its clients to gather all the credentials re-
quired for them to gain access; others can take a proactive ap-
proach by directly requesting all credentials from the appropriate
issuers on behalf of their client. To move away from these two ex-
tremes, which raise issues of efficiency and completeness, we pro-
pose Query Routing Rules (QRR) to customize distributed creden-
tial collection within a P2P authorization framework called Multi-
Trust, which gives peers autonomy in deciding whether and how
they respond to authorization requests. We provide a distributed
proof construction algorithm that peers can use to reason about au-
thorizations based on the access control policies and QRRs. This
algorithm is configurable, sound, and complete with regard to the
search space covered by QRRs. By configuring different QRRs,
MultiTrust can not only use flexible strategies to improve the per-
formance of DPA, but also emulate other distributed trust manage-
ment frameworks such as QCM and RT0 and serve as a reasoning
framework for authorization in heterogeneous distributed systems.
1. INTRODUCTION
In open distributed systems like the Web, often strangers interact
with one another to receive or provide services or other resources.
In this situation, authorization to access a resource often cannot be
decided by a requester’s identity alone: the requester’s attributes,
as attested to by digital credentials, matter more. Authorization
policies can be encoded as predicates in a formal language over
those attributes [15, 1, 16]. By collecting the appropriate creden-
tials from the access requester, the service provider proves that its
authorization policies are satisfied and then grants access.
When two parties are involved in the authorization, ATN (Au-
tomated Trust Negotiation) is an effective way to achieve autho-
rization without any prior knowledge of each other. Under ATN,
every peer has access control policies to limit outsiders’ access to
its sensitive resources. When an outsider tries to access a sensitive
resource, the ensuing trust negotiation contains a sequence of bilat-
eral credential disclosures. Less sensitive credentials are disclosed
first, to build up enough trust to disclose more sensitive credentials.
The negotiation ends when the provider’s authorization policies are
satisfied, it becomes clear that trust will not be established, or one
peer breaks off the negotiation. If trust is established, the resource
requester is authorized to access the target resource. We represent
this conclusion as the disclosure of a “credential” representing the
target resource.
When more than two parties are involved in an authorization,
the process is distributed, and DPAs become complex to con-
struct. When a peer requests a certain resource from a provider,
the provider may ask the requester to disclose credentials that the
requester does not have at the moment, but can obtain from third
parties (e.g., an online certifier or a credential repository). One
possibility is for the resource requester to request the credential
from an appropriate peer, and then forward the credential to the re-
source provider. Another option is to have the resource provider
directly request the credential from the appropriate peer. For ex-
ample, the QCM [11] credential retrieval system takes the latter ap-
proach, TrustBuilder [19] assumes the former, Bonatti and Sama-
rati [6] allow the provider and requester to work on fulfilling sep-
arate parts of the same policy, and PeerAccess [20] proposes that
a party should look for a missing credential if and only if it has a
“proof hint” policy for that kind of credential. Not only the dura-
tion but also the eventual outcome of the credential may depend on
who looks for a missing credential. For example, resource provider
Alice may require a reliability rating of her potential clients before
she will grant them access. If Bob supplies these ratings, he may be
willing to give them to Alice but not to Alice’s potential clients—
or vice versa. In this case, trust can only be established if the right
kind of peer asks Bob for the rating credential.
Another question is where to look for a needed credential. For
example, Bob may only give out ratings through his agent, Bar-
bara. The RT0 framework addressed this problem via a typing
system for credentials: the type of a credential indicates whether
to start the search by contacting its issuer or its owner [17]. From
the starting point of the search, a chain of referrals (delegations)
leads the searcher to the desired credential. In this framework, cre-
dentials and referrals are freely available to any searcher, and all
parties abide by the typing rules.
In this paper, we propose the MultiTrust logic framework and
Query Routing Rules (QRRs) as a practical approach to DPA in
open distributed systems. Under MultiTrust, each peer specifies its
own authorization policies for the resources that it owns. Peers can
selectively and proactively go to third parties to find some of the
credentials needed for the negotiation. QRRs are used to guide a
peer’s construction of authorization proofs by specifying where to
look for a particular fact. We make the following contributions in
the MultiTrust authorization framework.
• MultiTrust’s QRRs are sufficiently flexible to model the
proof construction behavior of other trust management sys-
tems, such as QCM and RT0. Thus MultiTrust can be used
to reason about the runtime behavior of these other systems,
and to reason about the runtime behavior when different
peers use different proof construction algorithms. In other
words, MultiTrust is the first framework to allow reasoning
about peers with heterogeneous DPAs.
• We give a distributed algorithm to construct proofs of autho-
rization based on QRRs. This algorithm limits the search
space to that covered by the QRRs, and guarantees com-
pleteness of search within this space, providing a significant
performance gain over blind brute-force search in open dis-
tributed systems.
In the rest of the paper, section 2 introduces the MultiTrust
framework, the base policy language, and QRRs. Section 3
presents the DPA algorithm for handling queries for credentials,
and discusses its soundness and completeness. Section 4 shows
how QRRs can be used to handle credential requests in different
ways, including those used in QCM and RT0. Section 5 discusses
optimization issues. Section 6 gives related work, and section 7
presents conclusions.
2. THE MULTITRUST FRAMEWORK
Figure 1 shows the structure of the MultiTrust framework, con-
sisting of a set of peers each with a knowledge base (KB) of policies
and an inference engine to dynamically construct and verify proofs
of policy satisfaction.
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Figure 1: The MultiTrust framework and KB structure.
A KB contains authorization policies and meta policies. Meta
policies such as QRRs control when and how the inference engine
reasons about authorization policies; they are the main focus of
this paper. Peers interact by sending each other messages, each of
which contains a set of explicit requests (e.g., a query for a creden-
tial) and/or statements (e.g., a credential or an authorization policy).
The MultiTrust architecture looks like that of all other trust man-
agement proposals, except for the inclusion of explicit meta poli-
cies, which are present only in PeerTrust [10], PeerAccess [20], and
Protune [7]. Similar to the latter two, MultiTrust’s meta policies are
separate from and orthogonal to its authorization policies. In prac-
tice, often a peer will have to prove that it owns the credential it is
sending in a message, e.g., by demonstrating knowledge of a pri-
vate key associated with a public key that appears in the credential.
These ownership tests can be explicitly specified in policies, but we
will completely omit them in this paper for simplicity. We will also
simplify matters by not considering explicit negative authorizations
in this paper.
2.1 Authorization Policies
The base policy language in MultiTrust is built on standard Dat-
alog facts. The language has two modal operators: signs and says.
Each MultiTrust fact is a Datalog fact preceded by a peer name
(a subset of the constants in the language) and either “signs” or
“says”. For example, “Alice says Friend(Bob)” and “Alice signs
Friend(Bob)” are MultiTrust facts that are said and signed, respec-
tively. Facts are rules with empty bodies, and rules have to be
signed or said as well. MultiTrust models a digital credential as
a signed rule; intuitively, the signature makes it verifiable and non-
repudiable. MultiTrust’s syntax, where f is any ordinary Datalog
atom and P is any peer name:
fact ::= P says f P signs f
rule ::= fact P says (P says f ← fact1, . . ., factn)
P signs (P says f ← fact, . . ., fact)
For brevity, we write “P says (P says f0 ← f1, . . ., fn)” as “P
says f0 ← f1, . . ., factn”, and “P signs (P says f0 ← f1, . . .,
fn)” as “P signs f0 ← f1, . . ., fn”. As suggested by the grammar
above, we will always shorten “P signs (P says f1)” to “P signs
f1”, and “P says (P says f1)” to “P says f1”.
A peer can apply the following inference rules within its local
KB.
• Instantiation Replace all occurrences of a variable in a rule
by a single constant or variable.
• Signing From “P says α” in P ’s knowledge base, derive “P
signs α”. This derivation can only take place at P ; e.g., if
Alice has something said by Bob, she cannot sign it on behalf
of Bob.
• Signature From “P signs α” derives “P says α”. This re-
flects the principle that a peer has to honor its signatures.
• Modus Ponens From rule “P (says signs) f ← f1, · · · , fm”
and facts f1 through fm, derive P says f .
The instantiation, signing and signature rules are uni-inference
rules: r uni-infers r′ iff r′ can be derived from r by applying zero
or more uni-inference rules.
2.2 Distributed Proofs of Authorization
Example 1 shows how MultiTrust encodes authorization poli-
cies, and shows multiple parties constructing proofs through inter-
active negotiation.
Example 1 (Fig. 2). Alice wants to buy a car at Best Motor-
vehicle World (BMW), and see whether she qualifies for BMW’s
premier discount (her target resource). BMW’s premier discount
policy says she must have a driver’s license from the Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and have a good credit rating from the
Credit Report Depot (CRD). CRD will disclose a good credit rating
for Alice if she satisfies CRD’s credit score requirement and CRD
has an information release authorization certificate issued by Alice.
This is formalized as the following policies in BMW’s KB.
R1: BMW signs PremierDiscount(X) ←
DMV signs DriversLicense(X), CRD signs GoodCredit(X)
R2: CRD signs GoodCredit(X) ←
X signs PermitRelease(CRD), CRD signs GoodCreditScore(X)
MultiTrust abstracts authorization to access a resource as a
signed permission from the resource owner, or a “said” permis-
sion that comes with a proof (defined later) of authenticity. The
negotiation for authorization begins when Alice queries for cre-
dential/resource “BMW signs PremierDiscount(Alice)”, which we
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Figure 2: Ways to handle Alice’s query, according to the literature. The dashed paths are considered undesirable.
model as the query “Alice ? BMW signs PremierDiscount(Alice)”
that Alice sends to BMW. The prefix “P ?” shows who sent the
query. For brevity, the following short names for factual creden-
tials are used in the rest of the section.
C1: BMW signs PremierDiscount(Alice)
C2: DMV signs DriversLicense(Alice)
C3: CRD signs GoodCredit(Alice)
C4: Alice signs PermitRelease(CRD)
C5: CRD signs GoodCreditScore(Alice)
Figure 2 shows two ways to resolve Alice’s request for C1.
Figure 2-A presents the passive-resource-owner approach, used in
many of the ATN proposals in the literature. After Alice requests
C1 from BMW, BMW asks Alice for C2. If Alice does not have a
digital version of her license, she asks the DMV for C2, then sends
C2 to BMW. Next, BMW asks Alice for C3. Alice asks CRD for
C3, supplies her release permission, then sends C3 back to BMW.
(Alternatively, BMW could ask Alice for both C2 and C3 at once.)
Finally, BMW sends C1 to Alice.
Figure 2-B shows the proactive-resource-owner approach used
in QCM and SD3 [12]. After Alice requests C1 from BMW, BMW
asks the DMV for C2 and asks CRD for C3, sequentially or in
parallel. CRD obtains Alice’s permission to release information,
and sends her credit rating to BMW. Once C2 and C3 are received,
BMW sends C1 back to Alice.
The passive-resource-owner approach depends on Alice to pro-
vide all required credentials to BMW. In the real world, it may be
preferable for BMW, rather than Alice, to retrieve C3 from CRD:
Alice may not know how to interact with CRD, or CRD may charge
Alice a high price but give BMW a bulk discount. Another possi-
bility, not modeled in this version of MultiTrust, is that CRD may
be willing to talk to BMW but not to Alice. From the viewpoint of
communication efficiency, having BMW retrieve C3 directly will
avoid the extra cost of routing C3 through Alice. On the other
hand, if the interaction with CRD requires significant effort, then
BMW may prefer to offload the effort onto its clients, to improve
BMW’s server’s scalability.
The advantages and disadvantages of the proactive-resource-
owner approach are the reverse of those of the passive-resource-
owner approach. For example, if Alice already has her digital
driver’s license, it is more efficient for BMW to retrieve it from
her than from the DMV. (In practice, the DMV will be unwilling to
disclose C1 to BMW anyway, for privacy reasons.)
2.3 Query Routing Rules
Example 1 suggests that we need a more flexible approach than
either passive-resource-owner or passive-resource-requester to de-
termine who will look for each needed credential:
• Peers should have autonomy in deciding whether and how
they respond to each request, and what requests they send to
others. This mirrors real-world autonomy of peers in open
systems.
• The decision on how to handle a particular request should
not be embedded in the authorization policies themselves.
The decision should be made at the meta level, orthogonal to
the policies. This aspect of MultiTrust will help it work with
a variety of underlying policy languages.
• The approach should be sufficiently expressive to encode the
approaches previously proposed in the literature (e.g., QCM
[11], SD3 [12], Cassandra [4], RT [17], BGR05 [2], TrustX
[5]) as special cases.
• The approach should be sufficiently declarative to reason
abstractly about what will happen when a request arrives.
• If a query fails to produce the desired credential(s) in re-
sponse, then the requester should be able to ask other peers
the same query, if desired. In other words, a negative re-
sponse to a request should be interpreted under the open
world assumption: another peer may respond more helpfully.
Our proposed approach is called Query Routing Rules (QRRs).
In this paper, the condition in a QRR will be over a single fact
(goal) in a query, although one can imagine more complex con-
ditions; a QRR rule is an entry in a peer’s KB of the form
“if condition then action” where condition is a Boolean com-
bination of predicates over the attributes of a query P ′ ? P signs f ,
or P ′ ? P says f , in the base language. In this paper, we use a min-
imal set of such predicates: equality and set membership tests over
peer names, other constants and variables from the base language,
and the following query attributes: requester, which is P ′; issuer,
the peer who signed or said f ; predicate, the name of the predicate
in f ; self, the peer who is currently executing the QRR; subjects,
the set of all arguments in f ; subject, which is the sole member
of subjects if the latter has cardinality 1, and is undefined other-
wise. For example, when Alice requests “BMW signs PremierDis-
count(Alice)” from BMW, then the following conditions are true:
requester == Alice, issuer==BMW, predicate==PremierDiscount,
subject==Alice, subjects=={Alice}. One could define additional
attributes that, for example, check whether the ith argument of the
query is bound or free, and whether the queried fact is signed or
said. The condition language requires a formal syntax, semantics,
and evaluation rules; space limits prevent us from presenting those,
so we have tried to use an extremely simple condition language
whose semantics will be obvious to readers.
An action takes the form “ask X [ for target ]”, where X is
requester, issuer, subject, or any specific peer name. To take
an action, the local peer sends a message to the peer X (unless X
is the local peer, in which case no action is taken). The message
body contains the original query with the requester stripped off,
unless target was present in the rule; in that case, the message body
contains target, which is a base-level rule.
When processing a query, a peer’s policy engine first tries to
answer the query locally, by looking for the requested credential
(fact) in the local KB and trying to infer it from the local KB. If
this process fails due to the need for a fact that is not available lo-
cally, then the policy engine will consult the QRR portion of the
KB to decide whether and where to send a message querying for
the missing fact(s). If no QRR matches the missing fact, the pol-
icy engine gives up and sends a negative answer to the querying
peer. As MultiTrust adopts an open world assumption, and we do
not model negative authorizations in this paper, a negative answer
means “I do not know and cannot help you further”. For exam-
ple, the QRR “if issuer == Alice then ask Alice” says that if
any locally-unavailable fact/credential was signed or said by Alice,
then the query for that fact should be forwarded to Alice. The QRR
“if subject == Carl then ask Carl” says that we should ask Carl
for any locally-unavailable credential with Carl as the only subject.
Because a request can match more than one QRR, MultiTrust
uses a multiple match semantics on QRRs. More precisely, we
store a set of QRRs, and try them one by one until the needed fact
is obtained or no more matching QRRs remain. Other possibilities
include a set of QRRs in which all matching rules are used in par-
allel, an ordered list for which only the first matching QRR is used,
or an ordered list in which the matching rules are tried in order.
3. PROOF CONSTRUCTION
Figure 3 gives an algorithm that a peer can use to handle in-
coming queries and to construct proofs of their answers. In the
algorithm, every peer has a local set of base policies KB and a
local routing rules knowledge base QRRKB . A call to a peer’s
QueryFacts routine takes five parameters: requester, goals, θ,
exclusions, and d, which respectively represent the original caller,
a set of facts (credentials) being queried (requested), the current
substitution for the free variables in goals, a set of unwanted sub-
stitutions, and a limit on the depth of recursive invocations of
QueryFacts (to guarantee termination). QueryFacts returns a
substitution and a proof. Before explaining the algorithm, we dis-
cuss substitutions in more detail.
Parameter θ specifies one value assignment for each free variable
in goals; an assignment X = ∗ means X is still free. The result of
applying θ to each formula in goals is written goals/θ. The querier
would like to receive a substitution θ′ and a proof of each member
of (goals/θ)/θ′, where θ′ is some (possibly empty) substitution. For
example, if Alice would like to find a friend of Bob’s, she can send
Bob the query “Bob signs friend(X)”, which translates to the call
QueryFacts(Alice, {Bob signs friend(X)}, {X = ∗}, {}, d). The
credential “Bob signs friend(Carl)”, expressed by the substitution
{X=Carl}, is a possible answer. The exclusions parameter is used
to prevent the query answer from including any substitution that
is covered by any single element of the exclusions parameter. For
example, if Alice would like to find out any of Bob’s friends other
than Carl and Eve, she can make the same call as before, but with an
exclusion set of {{X=Carl}, {X=Eve}}. A substitution α covers
substitution β if for all formulas g, there exists a substitution γ such
that (g/α)/γ is g/β. For example, {Y =Carl, Z=∗} covers {Y =Carl,
Z=Bob}. If {Y =Carl, Z=∗} ∈ exclusions, {Y =Carl, Z=Bob}
will not be returned as an answer.
We use a projection operation project(α, β) that returns the sub-
set of α whose variables also receive assignments in β. For exam-
ple, if we project {X = 5, Y = ∗, Z = Y } on {X = ∗, Z = 2},
we get {X = 5, Z = ∗}. If X is assigned different constant val-
ues, then the projection is undefined. However, QueryFacts guar-
antees that β’s substitution for X will cover α’s when projection
takes place.
At the beginning of QueryFacts, the peer checks whether all
goals have been proved with the given substitution θ. If any substi-
tution in the exclusion list covers θ, θ is not an acceptable answer.
If goals is not empty, but the invocation depth limit d has been
reached, failure is returned. The ⇐ is a binary operator for pair
values. For expression 〈x, y〉 ⇐ p, if v is a pair 〈v1, v2〉, then
the whole expression evaluates to true, with v1 and v2 assigned
to variables x and y respectively; if v is not a pair, then the whole
expression evaluates to false, with v1 and v2’s value unchanged.
Starting from line 16, the peer picks one of the target goals and
attempts to prove it. Here we do not stipulate which goal should
be picked, leaving it as the peer’s strategic choice; in a specific
domain, certain predicates will be more likely to be true than others.
The peer then tries to answer the query, first using local rules (lines
19-34).
Subroutine findSubstitutionAndSubgoals (figure 4) checks
whether r is a matching rule for goal/θ, and if so returns the substi-
tution for goal. Let h be the head of r; r is a matching rule if h can
be used to uni-infer goal/θ. Any substitution this subroutine returns
is covered by θ. If such a substitution θ′ is found for r, QueryFacts
recursively calls itself (line 24) to answer the subgoals in r/θ′ body
that are not in the KB yet and that prove goal/θ′1. The algorithm
enumerates such solutions until it has proved all goals with sub-
stitution θ2 (line 31). At that point the algorithm can compose and
return a proof sequence for goals/θ′2.
If the peer fails to answer the query after trying all existing lo-
cal rules, it goes through all its QRRs and forwards the query to
other peers for help (loop starting from line 36) until the query is
answered or all QRRs have been tried. The choice of which QRRs
to try first (effectively, of which matching QRRs to try first) is not
specified; domain knowledge will determine which peers are most
likely to prove helpful for which goals. The subroutine findRoute
decides whether the current qrr can be used to help prove goal by
sending a query for r to another peer P . r can either uni-infer
goal/θ, e.g., r instantiates to goal/θ, or r is a rule with non-empty
body and can possibly be used to derive goal/θ′. Line 40 sends
the query for r to the current selected helper P , who either runs the
same algorithm or, as discussed later, supports the same interface.
P may return failure, indicating that it is unable to or unwilling to
answer r; or a substitution θ3 and a sequence pi3 that proves r/θ3.
In the latter case, the peer further checks whether the body facts of
r/θ3 and the remaining goals goal′ can be recursively solved. If
yes, it composes a proof for all the original goals under the found
substitution and returns the results. If its attempt is unsuccessful, it
asks the same query of P again, except that the substitution in the
previous answer is included in the exclusion list. If all the attempts
fail, the peer returns failure, indicating that it cannot answer the
query.
The function saveProof(r,pi) saves the proof pi for r so that
it can be used in the future. Accordingly, retrieveProof(r)
1 local KB /* the local peer’s set of base policies */
2 local QRRKB /* the local peer’s set of QRRs */
3 QueryFacts(requester, goals, θ, exclusions, d)
4 Input requester : the peer who initiated this query
5 goals : the set of facts constituting the query
6 θ : the current substitution
7 exclusions : the set of unwanted substitutions
8 d : a limit on invocation depth
9 Output failure or 〈θnew , pinew〉 : θnew is a substitution and pinew is a proof sequence
10 { if (goals is empty)
11 if (exclusions does not cover θ)
12 return 〈θ,null〉 /*return θ and an empty sequence*/
13 return failure /* unable to answer this query */
14 if (d ≤ 0)
15 return failure /* ran out of time to answer this query */
16 goal := pick one element from goals
17 goals′ := goals− goal
19 foreach r ∈KB /* try local rules first */
20 if (〈θ′, subgoals〉 ⇐ findSubstitutionAndSubgoals(r, goal, θ)) /* check if r can possibly infer goal/θ */
21 sub := {x x ∈ subgoals and (∃y ∈KB: y uni-infers x/θ′)} /* those that can already be uni-inferred*/
22 pisub := concatenation of all retrieveProof(y), where y ∈KBand (∃x ∈ sub : y uni-infers x/θ′)
23 exclusions′ := exclusions
24 while (〈θ1, pi1〉 ⇐ QueryFacts(requester, subgoals− sub, θ′, exclusions′, d− 1))
25 exclusions′ := exclusions′ ∪ θ1
26 pi′1 := pisub ‖ pi1 ‖ retrieveProof(r) ‖
27 〈self, goal/θ1〉 /* compose a proof sequence */
28 θ′1 := project(θ1, θ)
29 KB:=KB∪goal/θ′1
30 saveProof(goal/θ′1, pi′1) /* save the proof for future use */
31 if (〈θ2, pi2〉 ⇐ QueryFacts(requester, goals′, θ′1, exclusions, d− 1))
32 pi′2 := pi
′
1 ‖ 〈self, goal/θ2〉 ‖ pi2
33 θ′2 := project(θ2, θ)
34 return 〈θ′2, pi′2〉
35 /* Local resolution failed. Use QRR to decide where to forward. */
36 foreach qrr ∈ QRRKB
37 if (〈r, P 〉 ⇐ findRoute(qrr, requester, goal, θ))
38 〈θ′, subgoals〉 ⇐ findSubstitutionAndSubgoals(r, goal, θ)
39 exclusions′ := exclusions
40 while (〈θ3, pi3〉 ⇐ P.QueryFacts(self, {r}, θ′, exclusions′, d− 1)) /* ask another peer P for help */
41 exclusions′ := exclusions′ ∪ θ3
42 pi′3 := pi3 ‖ 〈self, r/θ3〉 /* mark the disclosure of r/θ3 to self */
43 KB:=KB∪r/θ3
44 saveProof(r/θ3, pi′3)
46 sub := {x x ∈ subgoals and (∃y ∈KB: y uni-infers x/θ3)}
47 pisub := concatenation of all retrieveProof(y), where y ∈KB and (∃x ∈ sub : y uni-infers x/θ3)
48 exclusions1 := exclusions
49 while (〈θ4, pi4〉 ⇐ QueryFacts(requester, subgoals− sub, θ3, exclusions1, d− 1))
50 exclusions1 := exclusions1 ∪ θ4
51 pi′4 := pisub ‖ pi4 ‖ pi
′
3 ‖
52 〈self, goal/θ4〉
53 θ′4 := project(θ4, θ)
54 KB:=KB∪goal/θ′4
55 saveProof(goal/θ′4, pi′4)
56 if (〈θ5, pi5〉 ⇐ QueryFacts (requester, goals′, θ′4, exclusions, d− 1))
57 pi′5 := pi
′
4 ‖ 〈self, goal/θ5〉 ‖ pi5
58 θ′5 := project(θ5, θ)
59 return 〈θ′5, pi′5〉
60 return failure /* unable to answer this query */
61 }
Figure 3: MultiTrust Query Answering Algorithm
1 findSubstitutionAndSubgoals(r, goal, θ)
2 Input r : the rule to infer from
3 goal : the target rule to infer
4 θ : the current substitution
5 Output failure or 〈θnew , subgoals〉 : θ′ is a substitution and subgoals is a set of facts
6 { /* r unifies with goal/θ, ignoring the signs and says operators */
7 if (∃θ′ : r/θ′ uni-infers goal/θ)
8 θnew := such a θ′ that leaves the biggest number of free variables in r/θ′
9 return 〈θnew , null〉
11 /* The head of r unifies with goal/θ, ignoring the signs and says operators */
12 if (∃θ′ : the head of r/θ′ uni-infers goal/θ)
13 θnew := such a θ′ that leaves the biggest number of free variables in r/θ′
14 return 〈θnew , {the facts in r’s body}〉
16 return failure
18 }
Figure 4: MultiTrust algorithm to find a substitution and subgoals
returns the saved proof for r, or an empty sequence if no proof has
been saved. Before we examine the soundness and completeness
of this algorithm, we need a few definitions:
DEFINITION 1 (CONFIGURATION). The configuration M of
a MultiTrust system is a set of tuples 〈P, r〉 such that 〈P, r〉 ∈ M
iff peer P has rule r in its knowledge base. When we are only
interested in what happens after the moment where M exists, we
call M an initial configuration.
DEFINITION 2 (PROOF). Let pi be a finite sequence of
〈peer, rule〉 pairs in a system with initial configuration M:
〈P0, r0〉, . . . , 〈Pn, rn〉.
Suppose every 〈Pi, ri〉, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, satisfies one of these condi-
tions:
1. There exists ri0 such that 〈Pi, ri0〉 either is inM or appears
earlier in pi than 〈Pi, ri〉, and ri0 uni-infers ri.
2. There exist ri0 , . . . , rim , m ≥ 1, where ri0 is a rule with m
facts in its body, and ri1 , . . . , rim are facts, such that for all
0 ≤ j ≤ m, 〈Pi, rij 〉 either is in M or appears earlier in pi
than 〈Pi, ri〉, and all rij together derive ri through one ap-
plication of modus ponens plus zero or more uni-inferences.
3. There exists 〈Pj , ri〉, Pj 6= Pi, such that either 〈Pj , ri〉 ∈
M or 〈Pj , ri〉 appears earlier in pi than 〈Pi, ri〉. This means
that rule ri is disclosed (sent) from Pj to Pi.
Then we say that pi is a proof sequence in M, pi proves every pair
〈Pi, ri〉, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and ri has a proof at Pi.
When pi is a proof sequence, we can start from M, follow the se-
quence step by step, and eventually derive ri at peer Pi. For a set
G of facts, if pi proves 〈P, g〉 for every g ∈ G, then we say that pi
proves G at P . An empty sequence proves an empty goal set.
THEOREM 1 (SOUNDNESS). In a MultiTrust system with ini-
tial state M, suppose peer A runs QueryFacts(B, G0, θ0, E0,
d0) and receives answer (θˆ, pˆi). Then (1) θ0 covers θˆ, (2) θˆ is not
covered by any element in E0, and (3) pˆi is a proof for G0/θˆ at A
in M.
Proof. To prove part (1) of the theorem, we induct on the invoca-
tion depth d0. When d0 is 1, the invocation returns in line 12, which
means θˆ equals θ0. Now consider the case where d0 is n + 1. The
initial invocation must have returned at line 12, 34 or 59. In case
of line 12, θˆ equals θ0. If the return is at line 34, the θ′ returned
by findSubstitutionAndSubgoals (line 20) is always covered by
the current θ. By the induction hypothesis, the substitution θ1 re-
turned by QueryFacts in line 24 is covered by θ′, which means θ1
is also covered by θ. In line 28, a projection is done on θ1 and θ;
then the outcome θ′1 is still covered by θ, which equals θ0 in this
invocation. Similarly, we get that θ′2 is covered by θ′1. So the sub-
stitution eventually returned by QueryFacts in line 34 is covered
by θ0. Similarly we have that the substitution returned in line 59
is covered by θ0 as well. By induction, we know that every θˆ is
covered by θ0.
To prove part (2) of the theorem, we induct on d0. When d0 is
0, θ0 is returned in line 12, and θ0 is not covered by any element in
exclusions0 (line 11). Now consider the case when d0 is n + 1.
The initial invocation must have returned in line 12, line 34 or 59.
The case for line 12 is obvious, as θˆ equals θ0. Suppose the return
is from line 34. By the induction hypothesis, the substitution θ1
returned by QueryFacts in line 24 is not covered by any element
in exclusions. The projection in line 28 “relaxes” θ1 by removing
some value assignments and therefore makes the according vari-
ables free, which means θ′1 covers θ1. So θ′1 is also not covered
by any element of exclusions, which equals E0 in this invocation.
Continuing on, we find that θ′2 at line 33 is not covered by E0.
Similarly, we find that θ′5 at line 59 is not covered by E0 either. By
induction, θˆ is not covered by E0.
We also prove part (3) by an induction on d0. When d0 is 1, pˆi
must have been returned in line 12, which means both goals and pˆi
are empty; then pˆi is a valid proof for the empty set G0/θ0. Now
consider the case when d0 is n + 1. The initial invocation must
have returned in line 12, 34 or 59. The case for 12 is similar to that
of d0 = 0. Let us examine the latter two cases.
In the case of a return from line 34, the sequence pi′1 (line 27) is
composed as
pi1 ‖ retrieveProof(r) ‖ 〈self, r/θ1〉 ‖ 〈self, goal/θ1〉
By the induction hypothesis, we know that the pi1 returned at line
24 is a proof sequence for (subgoals − sub)/θ1 at self . As
r is already in the current peer’s KB, either (1) 〈self, r〉 is in
M and retrieveProof(r) returns an empty sequence that gener-
ates no pairs, or (2) r gets added to KB in line 29, 43, or 54,
so retrieveProof(r) returns the corresponding sequence saved by
saveProof. Examining how the saved sequence is composed and
using the induction hypothesis, we see that the saved sequence is
a proof for r at self in M, which means we can apply instanti-
ation to derive 〈A, r/θ1〉, and further apply modus ponens to de-
rive 〈P, goal/θ1〉. So the pi′1 here is a proof sequence for goal/θ1,
which equals goal/θ′1 due to the projection on θ in line 28. Contin-
uing on, we find that when we reach line 32, pi′2 is a proof sequence,
and it contains every element of A × goals/θ′2. This means pi′2 is
a proof for goals/θ′2 at self in M, where pi′2 equals pˆi, θ′2 equals
θˆ, and self equals A when QueryFacts returns at line 34.
In the case of a return from line 59, the argument proceeds as
for the previous case. The proof composition at line 42 appends
〈self, r/θ3〉 to pi3, because by induction pi3 is a proof for r/θ3 at
the other peer P , and r/θ3 then gets disclosed to A. 
Now we consider the completeness of this algorithm. For a
query-answering system to be truly complete in a distributed P2P
system, a peer potentially needs to directly or indirectly ask every
peer its query, which is undesirable in practice because of its high
costs. In MultiTrust, a peer directly asks only the set of peers that
it believes may be helpful, as specified by its QRRs. While this
provides a more practical approach than blindly asking every peer
in the system, the reduced search space means that some query an-
swers may be missed. Further, even with the use of QRRs to limit
the search space, QueryFacts could still run forever if we did not
take measures to limit its execution. We chose to use a depth limit
for recursive invocations; many other approaches are possible.
In practice, peers can run their own private implementations of
QueryFacts, as long as they agree to terminate, honor the exclu-
sions list, and return proof sequences and substitutions that cover
θ. Because we want to provide completeness guarantees, which
require an understanding of the measures each peer takes to limit
its search (QRRs and variable instantiation in our case), the proofs
that follow assume that every peer runs QueryFacts.
THEOREM 2 (FINITE SUBSTITUTION). Given values for pa-
rameters requester, goals, θ, exclusions, and d, there are only a
finite number of possible substitutions that QueryFacts can return.
Proof. QueryFacts does not instantiate a free variable to an ar-
bitrary constant. If a constant or variable occurs in the returned
substitution, this constant or variable must occur in goals, θ, the
local peer’s base rules and QRRs, or in those of a peer that was
called to help answer the query. Each peer has a finite number of
rules, and its QRRs point to a finite number of other peers. Within
a finite invocation depth, the set of reachable peers is finite, so there
are only finitely many constants and free variables that can appear
in the returned substitution. 
THEOREM 3 (INVOCATION TERMINATION). QueryFacts
always terminates.
Suppose that a peer calls QueryFacts repeatedly, with the same
set of goals, but with a monotonically growing set of exclusions
containing all substitutions returned by previous invocations. Then
QueryFacts returns failure after a finite number of invocations.
THEOREM 4 (ENUMERATION TERMINATION). The follow-
ing while loop always terminates:
while (〈θ, pi〉 ⇐ QueryFacts(A,G0, θ0, E, d))
E := E ∪ θ
Proof. The above two termination theorems are related. We do an
induction on the invocation depth parameter d. When d is 0, both
theorems hold. Now consider the case where d equals n+ 1.
• If the first invocation returns in line 12, the invocation termi-
nates here.
• By the induction hypothesis, we know the three while loops
(line 24, 40, and 49) always terminate because they each have
invocation depth limit d − 1 equal to n. So QueryFacts
always terminates on invocation depth n + 1.
• Every time QueryFacts returns, it contains a substitution
different from all previously returned substitutions, as spec-
ified in the exclusion set E. Because there are only a finite
number of substitutions, after a finite number of loop iter-
ations, QueryFacts returns a failure answer, which termi-
nates the while loop. 
DEFINITION 3 (QRR-COVERED). In MultiTrust, a proof se-
quence pi is covered by the system’s QRRs iff for every rule r that
is disclosed from peer P to A in pi, and every g that can be uni-
inferred from r or from r’s head, there is a QRR in A’s KB such
that (1) its condition is satisfied when g is requested from A, and
(2) this QRR’s action is ASK P for r′, where r′ instantiates to r.
DEFINITION 4 (FIRST UNI-ORIGINATOR AND FIRST ORIGINATOR).
Consider a proof sequence pi with initial configuration M
= 〈P0, r0〉, . . . , 〈Pn, rn〉.
• First uni-originator. The first uni-originator for 〈Pi, ri〉,
0 ≤ i ≤ n, is a pair 〈Pi, rj〉 inM or occurring no later than
〈Pi, ri〉 in pi, such that 〈Pi, rj〉 uni-infers 〈Pi, ri〉 within a
finite number of uni-inferences, and that if 〈Pi, rj〉 appears
in pi, then there does not exist 〈Pi, rk〉 that infers 〈Pi, rj〉
and 〈Pi, rk〉 is in M or precedes 〈Pi, rj〉 in pi.
• First originator. Let 〈Pi, rj〉 be a first uni-originator for
〈Pi, ri〉 in pi.
– If 〈Pi, rj〉 ∈M, then 〈Pi, rj〉 is also a first originator
for 〈Pi, ri〉.
– Suppose there exists 〈Pi, rj0〉, 〈Pi, rj1〉, ..., 〈Pi, rjm〉,
m ≤ 1, such that (1) for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n, 〈Pi, rjk 〉
is in M or precedes 〈Pi, rj〉 in pi, and (2) rj0 is a
rule with m facts i its body, rj1 , ..., rjm are facts, and
they together derive rj with one application of modus
ponens and zero or more uni-inferences. Then a first
uni-originator of 〈Pi, rj0〉 is also a first originator of
〈Pi, ri〉.
If 〈Pi, rj〉 is a first originator (or uni-orginator) of 〈Pi, ri〉, we also
say rj is a first originator (or uni-originator) of ri at Pi in pi. If
〈Pi, rj〉 /∈ M, we know from the definition of a proof sequence
that rj is disclosed from some other peer.
THEOREM 5 (FINITE COMPLETENESS). In a MultiTrust sys-
tem with initial configuration M, suppose that peer B invokes
QueryFacts(B, G0, θ0, E0, d0) on peer A, where θ0 is not cov-
ered by E0. If there exists a sequence pi0 such that (1) pi0 is a proof
for G0/θ0 at A in M, (2) d0 > L, where L is the length (number
of pairs) of pi, and (3) pi is covered by the system’s QRRs, then:
1. QueryFacts returns 〈θˆ, pˆi〉, where pˆi is a proof for G0/θˆ at
A in M.
2. If one calls QueryFacts repeatedly as specified in the pseu-
docode below, then QueryFacts will eventually return a pair
that contains θ0.
E := E0
while (〈θˆ, pˆi〉 ⇐ QueryFacts(A,G0, θ0, E, d0))
E := E ∪ θ
Proof. Suppose QueryFacts(B, G0, θ0, E0, d0) returns 〈θˆ, pˆi〉 in-
stead of failure. Then by the completeness theorem, we know that
pˆi is a proof for G0/θˆ at A in M, which proves point 1 of the finite
completeness theorem. From point 1, we know that the invoca-
tion in the enumeration loop of point 2 will return a pair if a proof
sequence exists. Further applying the enumeration termination the-
orem and the first two points of the soundness theorem, we know
that the enumeration loop eventually returns a pair containing θ0.
So if we prove that QueryFacts(B, G0, θ0, E0, d0) always returns
a pair, we have proved the whole finite completeness theorem.
We conduct an induction on L, the length of pi0. When L is 0,
since pi0 proves G0/θ′0, G0 is also empty, the invocation returns
a pair in line 12. Assume the theorem is true for pi0 with length
L ≤ n − 1. Consider the case when L is n. If G0 is empty, the
invocation returns at line 12. So we only need to examine the case
where G0 is nonempty. Then the first invocation of QueryFacts
reaches line 16 with variable goals equal to G0. Now it picks one
element from goals and assigns it to goal. Since pi0 proves goal/θ
at A (θ equals θ0 as this is the initial invocation), we know that
〈A, goal/θ〉 is in pi0. Let γ be a first originator for goal/θ in A
(self equals A at this point). We have the following different cases:
Case 1a. 〈A, γ〉 is in M and γ is not a first uni-originator for
goal/θ. Then γ must be a rule whose head uni-infers goal/θ. If
the algorithm returns before the loop that goes through all rules in
KB (line 19), it has returned a pair. Or, the loop eventually reaches
the iteration where r equals γ, since γ is in KB and can be used
to infer goal/θ. The set sub contains those subgoals that, after
applying substitution θ′, can be uni-inferred by rules in KB, and
(subgoals − sub) contains those that cannot be uni-inferred yet.
Then for every s ∈ (subgoals − sub), there exists s′, such that
〈A, s′〉 occurs in pi0 to the left of 〈A, goal/θ〉 and s′ uni-infers
s/θ′. If we replace every such 〈A, s′〉 in pi0 by 〈A, s〉, then the
resulting new sequence contains a subsequence that is a valid proof
sequence for (subgoals− sub)/θ′. Further, the length of the new
sequence is less than n because at least 〈A, goal/θ〉 is not in it. By
the induction hypothesis, we know that the recursive invocation to
answer (subgoals− sub)/θ′ at line 24 successfully returns a pair;
and unless the whole invocation returns a pair already, the while
loop on the same line will reach the point where the returned θ1
equals θ′. If so, since all goals in subgoals/θ′ have been answered,
the algorithm is able to compose a proof for goal/θ and save it in
KB before the algorithm reaches line 31 to answer goals′/θ. Now
with regard to the new configuration that contains 〈A, goal/θ〉, the
new sequence pi0 less 〈A, goal/θ〉 is still a valid proof sequence for
(goals−goal)/θ′ and its size is n−1. By the induction hypothesis,
we know that the invocation in line 31 returns a pair, which means
that the whole invocation ends by returning a pair in line 34.
Case 1b. 〈A, γ〉 is in M and γ is a first uni-originator for
goal/θ. The proof proceeds as a special case for 1a: the peculiarity
is that because γ uni-infers goal/θ0, the set subgoals returned by
findSubstitutionAndSubgoals at line 20 is empty, which does not
affect the above proof.
Case 2a. 〈A,γ〉 is not in M and γ is not a first uni-originator
for goal/θ. Then γ must be a rule whose head uni-infers goal/θ.
Since γ is goal’s first originator and 〈A, γ〉 is not in M, 〈A, γ〉
must have been disclosed from another peer C, and 〈C, γ〉 is either
in M or to the left of 〈A, γ〉 in pi0. Because pi0 is covered by the
system’s QRRs, we know that there exists q ∈ QRRKB , such
that findRoute(q,B, goal, θ) returns 〈γ′, C〉, and γ′ can be used
to uni-infer γ. Unless the algorithm returns already, the loop that
goes through all QRRs in KB ( line 36) will encounter q, and the
subsequent findRoute returns 〈γ′, C〉. Then r equals γ′ and P
equals C. Now consider the two situations:
1. If 〈C, γ〉 is in pi0, then there is a subsequence of pi0 that
proves 〈C, γ〉 with length less than n. Further, it will still
be a proof sequence if we replace 〈C, γ〉 with 〈C, γ/θ′〉.
By the induction hypothesis, the remote recursive invoca-
tion at line 40 returns a pair. And either the current in-
vocation returns a pair already, or the current loop will
reach a point where the returned θ3 equals θ′. Since r
can be used to derive goal/θ, given the maximal nature of
findSubstitutionAndSubgoals, we know that r/θ3 can still
be used to infer goal/θ. Now we have r/θ3 in KB, which
means the rest of the proof proceeds as for case 1a.
2. If 〈C, γ〉 is not in pi0, then it must be in KB . Since L is at
least 1, currently d is at least 2. Then the remote call at line
40 has depth limit 1, which can still return 〈C, γ/θ′〉. The
rest of the proof for this subcase proceeds as for subcase 1.
Case 2b. 〈A,γ〉 is not in M and γ is a first uni-originator for
goal/θ. With the same argument made in 1b, the proof proceeds
as a special case for 2a. This completes the proof. 
4. CUSTOMIZING MULTITRUST
MultiTrust’s QRRs support a variety of ways to retrieve cre-
dentials, allowing it to emulate the message-passing and proof-
construction behavior of other trust management systems.
Passive-Resource-Owner. In this approach, the service provider
requires that the requester provide any credential that the service
provider does not have available locally. This is easily encoded
with QRRs. If we use the following QRRs in Example 1, then the
proof is constructed as in figure 2-A.
Alice: if (true) then ask issuer
BMW: if (true) then ask requester
CRD: if (true) then ask issuer
DMV: if (true) then ask issuer
QCM Approach. In QCM, the service provider proactively
requests credentials from their issuers. This is achieved
by the QRR configuration where every peer has one QRR,
if (true) then ask issuer. This results in the Example 1 negoti-
ation in figure 2-B.
Optimized Approach. When CRD does not accept requests
from individuals, the following QRRs have BMW initiate commu-
nications with CRD, saving Alice time (figure 5-A).
Alice: if (true) then ask issuer
BMW: if (issuer == DMV) then ask subject
if (issuer == CRD) then ask CRD
CRD: if (true) then ask issuer
DMV: if (true) then ask issuer
First Alice requests C1 from BMW. BMW finds a local rule R1
that matches C1, so it recursively calls QueryFacts on itself for
fact C2. There is no local rule to derive C2, so BMW checks its
QRRs, and finds a match that tells it to ask the subject of S2, Alice.
When Alice calls QueryFacts on C2, she does not find a match in
her base policies, and her QRRs direct her to ask DMV for C2. The
proof continues as described in the figure.
RT0 Approach. Credentials are typed in the RT0 framework,
and the type determines where a credential is stored: at a party
reachable in a chain starting from the issuer, from the subject, or
both. If both, a preference among the two is given. MultiTrust can
implement this searching strategy with the pseudocode below for
creating QRRs based on credential types. These QRRs are used
if the credential cannot already be inferred from the current peer’s
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Figure 5: MultiTrust handling of a query for a credential.
knowledge base, and should be placed after any domain-specific
QRRs. For example, suppose that Alice is trying to obtain her stu-
dent ID, a credential traceable from the issuer. When she asks the
university for her ID, the university should have a domain-specific
rule that directs it to ask its registrar for the ID (the first rule below).
if (predicate == studentID) then ask registrar
if issuer-tracing-preferred then
if issuer-traceable then ask issuer
if subject-traceable then ask subject
if subject-tracing-preferred then
if subject-traceable then ask subject
if issuer-traceable then ask issuer
Support for Credential Repositories Instead of being stored
at a location that is guaranteed to be traceable from its issuer or
owner, a credential might be kept at a third party repository. We
can generalize type-based credential retrievers [18], whose search
focuses on credential issuers and owners, by configuring QRRs to
retrieve credentials from repository peers and from peers who know
how to get various kinds of credentials and are willing to do the
legwork, as shown below.
if (self ∈ subjects) then ask myProxy.org
if (predicate == discount) then ask eCoupons.com
5. DISCUSSION
In an open distributed system like the Web, sending a query to all
servers is impractical. Just as people go to Ebay for auctions and
Amazon for book listings, QRRs specify where a peer should look
for a certain credential, and significantly reduce the search space.
In a properly configured system, the number of applicable QRRs at
a peer’s KB will be small, the resulting search space among multi-
ple peers will be modest, and the proof construction algorithm can
quickly succeed or fail.
When MultiTrust is used to emulate other trust management
systems, the set of QRRs at a peer is predetermined by the em-
ulated system. But we can take advantage of MultiTrust’s flexi-
bility and go far beyond this, to support peers who dynamically
share and self-configure their QRRs, much as one learns about
useful new sites on the Web. For example, peers can observe,
record, and rate the effectiveness of their own QRRs in produc-
ing proofs. Using machine learning techniques, these observations
can lead to improvements such as changing the order in which
QRRs are tried (the equivalent of humans learning to only ask
Expedia after trying Travelocity, and to try Google before Ya-
hoo) and adding restrictions to a QRR condition. Peers can gos-
sip and exchange QRRs and QRR effectiveness ratings. Brokers
can give their clients new QRRs to help them find credentials,
and clients can consult their favorite brokers using QRRs such as
“if (true) then ask credential-google.com”. Peers can even rely
on reputation ratings to determine who they will accept new QRRs
from. Thus each peer can adjust its query-answering strategies as
the world evolves, and also answer queries faster by retiring poorly-
performing QRRs (at the cost of possibly failing to construct a
proof), much as people typically only consult their favorite Internet
search engine even though no search engine covers all of the web.
We hope that this vision will inspire future work in this area.
Although MultiTrust assumes that all involving peers cooperate
and respect the interaction protocols as specified by the parameters
of QueryFacts so that the completeness theorem applies, this as-
sumption is not required for correctness. Since QueryFacts can
verify the proofs it receives, peers cannot cheat by returning bogus
messages.
MultiTrust peers can disclose credentials before they are re-
quested, to accelerate a negotiation. If Alice knows from previ-
ous experience that BMW always wants a DMV-signed driver li-
cense when she asks for a discount, and that CRD always needs
her signed authorization before releasing her credit rating to BMW,
then Alice can predisclose those credentials to BMW when she sub-
mits her request for a discount. We can use a QRR-style language
to specify the predisclosure of credentials so that the negotiation
proceeds as in figure 5-B.
6. RELATED WORK
Appel and Felten [1] give a distributed authorization framework
that uses higher-order logic to express application specific access-
control policies. An authentication request carries a proof ex-
pressed in the higher-order logic that can be easily verified by a
checker. Based on this framework, Bauer et al. [3] develop a web
page access-control system that supports automatic certificate re-
trieval similar to QCM to construct proofs. This proof construc-
tion mechanism is enhanced in [2], where peers fully cooperate to
construct proofs. MultiTrust supports local autonomy instead of re-
quiring full cooperation, as we find the latter unrealistic for an open
system. MultiTrust also supports a much broader, configurable way
of retrieving certificates than these systems, which retrieve certifi-
cates only from their issuers. For example, a server can choose to
let its clients find all the credentials they need, by omitting QRR
rules for those credentials. A client can install QRRs that cause it
to launch an extensive network search for every credential it needs,
do no network search at all, or do a limited search that is tuned for
each particular kind of credential.
The Secure Dynamically Distributed Datalog (SD3) trust man-
agement system [12] can automatically contact a remote party to
gather further credentials during the evaluation of a policy. SD3
is the successor of QCM [11], which also does automatic creden-
tial retrieval. As a variant of SD3, D3log [13] extends QCM by
supporting recursion and intensional answers. D3log describes the
whole possible space a server can non-deterministically search be-
fore responding to a query. The MultiTrust approach could be used
to allow these systems to configure a server’s behavior to selec-
tively confine its search space, or to balance the burden of creden-
tial retrieval between the server and the client.
Derived from SPKI and SDSI, SPKI/SDSI 2.0 provides a dis-
tributed access control framework based on digital certificates. Au-
thorization is done by verifying the validity of certificates. Central-
ized credential discovery schemes for SPKI have been proposed in
[8] and [9]. RT can automatically retrieve relevant credentials at
run time [18] based on the type of the credentials. The PeerAccess
language [20] (and to some extent its predecessors [10]) provide
configurable support for credential search during trust negotiation
that is very close in spirit to our QRRs, but without any runtime
algorithms to perform and control the search. MultiTrust could be
used to provide these and other noteworthy trust negotiation sys-
tems not described here (e.g., [6, 4, 14, 7, 5, 19]) with a more
general, locally-customizable means of credential retrieval and ef-
ficient, non-repudiable policy evaluation when the relevant policies
and credentials are distributed among different peers.
7. CONCLUSION
We were motivated in this paper by a desire to be able to de-
scribe today’s real-world open-system heterogeneous authorization
scenarios, such as one finds at supercomputing centers that sport
a variety of authorization-related repositories, services, resource
owners, access policies, credential types, authorization paradigms,
and clients. To this end, we have presented the MultiTrust lan-
guage and algorithm for distributed non-repudiable proof construc-
tion, which support a significant degree of local autonomy and local
customization in proof construction and in the degree and manner
in which each peer is willing to search for needed credentials. We
have proved that this algorithm is sound and complete with respect
to the credential search procedures that each peer chooses to adopt.
Further, we have shown that MultiTrust’s credential search proce-
dures can model the message-passing behavior of other well-known
trust management systems; thus MultiTrust can be used to reason
about the runtime behavior of these systems as they interact with
one another in a large open system.
In future work, we plan to limit the set of proofs cached by each
party (currently all proofs are cached), and show that the Multi-
Trust approach will work with a variety of base policy languages.
We also plan to develop a set of distributed proof construction al-
gorithms with the same interface as the algorithm presented in this
paper but radically different proof construction strategies, such that
parties can pick any algorithm from the set and be guaranteed that
the soundness and completeness guarantees presented in this paper
will still hold.
8. REFERENCES
[1] A. W. Appel and E. W. Felten. Proof-carrying authentication.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, pages 52–62, 1999.
[2] L. Bauer, S. Garriss, and M. K. Reiter. Distributed proving in
access-control systems. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, Berkeley, May 2005.
[3] L. Bauer, M. A. Schneider, and E. W. Felten. A general and
flexible access-control system for the web. In Proc. 11th
USENIX Security Symposium, San Francisco, Aug. 2002.
[4] M. Y. Becker and P. Sewell. Cassandra: distributed access
control policies with tunable expressiveness. In Policies for
Distributed Systems and Networks, Yorktown Hts., 2004.
[5] E. Bertino, E. Ferrari, and A. C. Squicciarini. Trust-X: A
peer-to-peer framework for trust establishment. IEEE
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering,
16(7):827–842, Jul. 2004.
[6] P. Bonatti and P. Samarati. Regulating Service Access and
Information Release on the Web. In Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Athens, Nov. 2000.
[7] P. A. Bonatti and D. Olmedilla. Driving and monitoring
provisional trust negotiation with metapolicies. In Workshop
on Policies for Distributed Systems and Networks, 2005.
[8] D. E. Clarke, J.-E. Elien, C. M. Ellison, M. Fredette,
A. Morcos, and R. L. Rivest. Certificate chain discovery in
SPKI/SDSI. Journal of Computer Security, 9(4):285–322,
2001.
[9] J.-E. Elien. Certificate discovery using SPKI/SDSI 2.0
certificates. Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, May 1998.
[10] R. Gavriloaie, W. Nejdl, D. Olmedilla, K. Seamons, and
M. Winslett. No registration needed: How to use declarative
policies and negotiation to access sensitive resources on the
semantic web. In European Semantic Web Symposium, 2004.
[11] C. A. Gunter and T. Jim. Policy-directed certificate retrieval.
Software Practice and Experience, 30(15):1609–1640, 2000.
[12] T. Jim. SD3: A trust management system with certified
evaluation. In IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, 2001.
[13] T. Jim and D. Suciu. Dynamically distributed query
evaluation. In ACM Symposium on Principles of Database
Systems, Santa Barbara, CA, May 2001.
[14] H. Koshutanski and F. Massacci. Interactive access control
for web services. In IFIP Information Security Conference,
2004.
[15] B. Lampson, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber.
Authentication in distributed systems: theory and practice.
ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 10(4):265–310, 1992.
[16] N. Li, B. Grosof, and J. Feigenbaum. Delegation Logic: A
logic-based approach to distributed authorization. ACM
Trans. on Information and System Security, 6(1), Feb. 2003.
[17] N. Li and J. Mitchell. RT: A role-based trust-management
framework. In Third DARPA Information Survivability
Conference and Exposition, Apr. 2003.
[18] N. Li, W. Winsborough, and J. Mitchell. Distributed
Credential Chain Discovery in Trust Management (Extended
Abstract). In Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Philadelphia, 2001.
[19] K. Seamons, M. Winslett, and T. Yu. Limiting the Disclosure
of Access Control Policies during Automated Trust
Negotiation. In Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium, San Diego, CA, Feb. 2001.
[20] M. Winslett, C. C. Zhang, and P. A. Bonatti. PeerAccess: A
logic for distributed authorization. In Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2005.
